Introduction
By their nature macro-economic risks cannot be avoided, but their e¤ect can be mitigated by sharing them between generations. The optimal design of intergenerational risk sharing has been investigated by many authors, including Gordon and Varian [1988] , Beetsma and Bovenberg [2007] and Gollier [2008] . While this literature focuses on the optimal design, this paper focuses on the political limits of optimal risk sharing instead.
Intergenerational risk sharing necessitates that future generations participate, but unborn generations are not able to agree on such participation. Once the young enter the insurance market, the outcome for the elderly is known and is thus uninsurable. Markets can therefore not implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing. The government can enforce participation and is thereby in the position to ensure the ex ante e¢ cient transfer scheme. This paper's central observation is that political decisions are not driven by ef…ciency. Political decisions depend on political support of voters. Political parties are not concerned with insurance but with redistributing towards large and/or easy swayed voters. The institution that is in a position to implement insurance is thus motivated by redistribution instead.
The central question is whether ex ante e¢ cient risk sharing still arises endogenously in a democratic society that is primarily concerned with redistribution.
This question is analyzed with a probabilistic voting model where the government gives priority to larger and easier swayed cohorts. The resulting answer is that politically determined allocations generally di¤er from the optimal allocations.
From an ex ante perspective they are nonetheless better than "autarky" with each generation saving for itself. In a democratic political process, some risk sharing still arises. The reason is that low returns on savings for the elderly induces politicians to redistribute from young to older generations. The lower incomes of the latter makes their political support more sensitive to the tax policy, as political support depends linearly on utility and marginal utility is decreasing.
This paper build on the literature on the political economy of Social Security, see Galasso and Profeta [2002] for an overview. This literature focuses mainly on …xed transfers in a non-stochastic environment. Rangel and Zeckhauser [1999] and Demange [2005] are exceptions who consider a stochastic environment using a median voter model. The median voter model has the limitation that the majority generation holds all political power. This generally leads to a wide range of rationalizable equilibria when the median voter is young and the prediction of maximum taxation when the median voter is old. Following D'Amato and Galasso [2008] this paper proposes that a probabilistic voting model is better suited to analyze the political limits of risk sharing and the e¤ect of aging upon that. In this approach a minority is no longer politically powerless and taxation is an important factor for voters but not necessarily the only one.
The main di¤erence between this paper and D'Amato and Galasso is the differing question. Bernouilli distributed with r L < 1 < r H , where the superscript indicates the state of the economy. State L occurs with probability 0 5 5 1, and state H occurs with complementary probability 1 . There is constant geometric population growth n: N t = (1 + n)N t 1 , where N t is the number of young agents in period t and n > 1. The agents in the model are now discussed in turn.
Individuals
Agents born at time t have a time-separable utility function with felicity functions exhibiting constant relative risk aversion (CRRA):
Here c y t and c o t represent consumption in the …rst and second period respectively of an agent born at time t. There is no time preference in this model. This could easily be included, but that would not add to the conclusion nor change it.
The young maximize expected life-time utility with respect to savings, taking taxes in the current period as given. For young agents, this boils down to maximizing u(c y t ) + Eu(c o t ) subject to w = c y t + t + s t and given expectations on the tax rate in the next period (addressed below). The constraint follows from the life-time budget of the individual. Consumption in old age depends on the state of the economy and expected second period consumption is given by:
The probability distribution of capital market returns is common knowledge; the distribution of taxation the next period is not a priori clear. At time t, a young individual has to form expectations, where b i t+1 denotes the expectation of someone in period t about tax-level in state i (i = L; H) at timet + 1. The model is closed with rational expectations: agents'conjecture about the probability distribution of taxes is correct.
Higher aggregate savings lead to lower bene…ts the next period, as the government does not take into account whether low income of the old resulted from low returns on savings or low savings. Individual savings have a neglectable e¤ect on aggregate savings, and absent coordination agents will therefore not take into account the e¤ect of current savings on future bene…ts.
Older generations leave no bequests and have no decision to make. They consume their entire accrued savings and their bene…ts, indicated by b t (1+n) t .
First-best: optimal intergenerational risk sharing
In line with, among others, Ball and Mankiw [2001] , ex ante e¢ ciency is used as the welfare concept. Ex ante e¢ ciency evaluates utility of agents prior to birth, when agents do not know in what state they are born. A policy may a¤ect utility positively in one state of nature but negatively in another one. A policy is ex ante e¢ cient if it maximizes the expected utility of an unborn individuals.
The solution technique is taken from Van Hemert [2005] . Let H k denote the set of all possible k-histories in k subsequent periods. As there are two possible states of the world in each period, there are 2 k elements in H k . Consider maximizing utility of a generation, conditioning on the last k periods only. Denoting two particular k-histories by h and h + , ex ante utility is maximized by:
R(h); s(h); (h) denote the interest rate, savings and taxes that occur in the particular k-history h; taxation and savings are contingent on the history the economy (the previous states), including the current state.
As an example, consider k = 2 histories. There are four possibilities for both
, where the last entry denotes the last time period. Note that h t denotes the k-history at time t, whereas h t+1 denotes the k-history at time t+1. P [h t = h; h t+1 = h + ] denotes the probability that h t = h and h t+1 = h + . This probability may equal zero, for example when
; the …rst history indicates that state L occurred at time t and the latter indicates that H occurred at that time.
The maximization procedure takes ever more periods into account until convergence. The number of k-histories after which convergence emerges, indicates over how many generations risk is e¤ectively spread.
Second-best: political redistribution
The government has the ability to tax the young generation and transfer the collected contributions to the old. Government runs a balanced budget with total contributions equaling total bene…ts. The incumbent party maximizes the following function:
The bene…ts per retiree at time t are again indicated by b t . This equation results from probabilistic voting, see Persson and Tabellini [2000] . With probabilistic voting two competing vote-seeking political parties state their preferred tax-rate before elections and commit to this policy. Voters take the stated tax-rate into account while also considering a second and …xed characteristic of the political parties. This characteristic cannot be changed by the party and it may be interpreted as party ideology or charisma of the political leader. The more the …xed component matters, the fewer voters can be swayed by a change of policy.
A value of larger than 1 indicates that young voters are relatively less inclined to vote ideologically. They are more responsive to policy changes than older voters and more important to politicians because of it. As the parties are symmetric, they face the same maximization problem. Therefore their chosen policies converge, the outcome of which is given by the equation, see again Persson and Tabellini.
Following Meijdam and Verbon [1996] , government and agents take each other's action as given. In each period the young maximize expected life-time utility taking taxes as given, and the government maximizes the probability of being elected taking savings as given.
The outcome of the two separate maximization-problems of individuals and government is equivalent to maximizing W (:) simultaneously with respect to both savings and taxes together, that is:
W t ( t js t ; s t 1 ) subject to (1 + n) t = b t and subject to w = c
Government can do no better as their objective function is maximized, but given the maximizing value of taxation, maximizing W (:) coincides with maximizing life-time utility of the younger cohort. The reason is that utility of the young cohort enters additively. Complicating point in solving this equation is that the optimal values of savings and taxation depend on savings a period earlier and on the current (rational) expectations of taxes a period later, which in turn coincides with actual taxes. The appendix shows existence of a unique equilibrium.
An alternative for the probability voting model is the median voter model.
This set-up has been studied by Browning [1975] However, a disadvantage is that it predicts a sharp, discontinuous shift in political power when population growth changes sign; this is a consequence of the lack of political power of even a large minority. When retirees form a majority a taxation of 100% is predicted. When young voters form a majority, there is a wide range of rationalizable results, including zero transfers. Probabilistic voting instead allows a more reasonable and precise analysis of the e¤ect of population growth on e¢ ciency properties of pension politics.
First-best versus second-best
This section determines, discusses and compares …rst-and second-best allocations.
First-best allocations refer to the allocations that maximize utility of a steady-state generation. These are the ex ante e¢ cient outcomes which are compared by the outcomes of a political process driven by redistribution. The latter are referred to as the second-best allocations. Before turning to the general case, the case were savings are …xed are considered. This o¤ers insight in the model and allows for a simple analytical solution.
Fixed savings
In order to exclusively focus on the mechanism of risk sharing, …rst the case of …xed savings is considered. The problem is further simpli…ed by allowing only non-negative transfers and transfers in state L.
The ex ante e¢ cient transfer when capital return is low, follows from maximizing the following function where s denotes …xed and exogenous savings 2 :
The …rst order condition equals:
Solving this equation gives the solution:
2 The expression is derived as follows. Ex ante utility is given by:
This simpli…es to:
, as all expressions without can be omitted.
The …rst-best tax increases when wages increase or when savings or capital return in the low state decrease. Higher income for young and a lower income for retirees increase the ability and the need respectively to insure retirees against a shortfall in accrued savings. The e¤ect of population growth is ambiguous; if there are relatively many young workers, this increases the rate of return of PAYG. The other way round, the same income can be insured to the old by a lower contribution of the young, which can consume the remaining. This income e¤ect and insurance e¤ect work in opposite directions and the net e¤ect on the …rst-best taxation depends on the particular values of the parameters involved.
The second-best allocation follows from the following procedure:
The …rst order condition is:
Solving this equation gives the following solution:
This expression gives the transfer decided on by the government. It increases when wages increase or when savings decrease, as poorer voters are easier swayed by a transfer. The reason is that support depends linearly on utility and utility increases faster for lower values of consumption. The net e¤ect of population growth is unambiguously negative. An increase in n leads to more political clout for the young. This e¤ect dominates the lower rate of return of a PAYG-arrangement.
The expressions for the …rst-best and second-best transfers generally di¤er but coincide in a special yet meaningful case. When there is an equal number of older and younger voters and they are equally in ‡uence able by the tax policy ( = 1 + n = 1), …rst-best and second-best transfers coincide and equal
. This is discussed in more detail below. Generally the transfers do not coincide as the expressions indicate and the following picture illustrates. The expected return of the …nancial asset equals 1.25, so for values n > 0:25 the rate of return of a PAYG-arrangement is higher than that of the capital market.
In expected terms the economy is dynamically ine¢ cient from that point on. As savings are …xed this does not a¤ect savings.
Population growth, n, is a main determinant of di¤erences in …rst-best and second-best taxation, but is not the only one. The di¤erent degree to which young and older voters are loyal to a party, captured by , in ‡uences the discrepancy between …rst-best and second-best as well. A value exceeding one indicates that the old are relatively more ideological, which may result from habit-formation or party loyalty. A value lower than one results when the old are more footloose and thereby exert de facto extra political power. This would occur if older voters care relatively more about pensions than the working generation, for whom pensions is an issue that will become relevant years from now. A special case results if
. Then the cohort-size e¤ect and the ideological factor cancel out and the transfer decided by government is ex ante e¢ cient.
Thus far the tax scheme involved only non-negative transfers and only transfers in the L state with low capital returns. This allowed focusing on the most important insurance-aspect of risk sharing; workers providing support to the elderly when capital markets tumble. This restrictive assumption means that only labor is taxed, not capital or income. While labor is indeed most heavily taxed in most Western countries, this assumption is restrictive nonetheless. If taxation can be both positive and negative in both states of the world, transfers in state L would be the same. First-best and second-best transfers in state H would change and they can be derived analogously with r H replacing r L in the expressions given above. This case is not analyzed further; incorporation of taxation in state H in‡uences the size of the welfare e¤ects, but does not change qualitative conclusions.
It is however important to note that what is called here …rst-best is second-best from a more general perspective that considers less restrictive forms of taxation.
Endogenous savings
The assumption of …xed savings provides insight in the model and allows for analytical solutions. These …xed savings can be understood as mandatory and …xed contributions to a De…ned Contribution scheme that cannot be avoided and can also not be increased easily. Nonetheless, …xed savings is a stark assumption.
One particular e¤ect is that transfers solely depend on the current state (L or H) instead of the entire history. With endogenous savings this is no longer case, opening up the possibility that discrepancies between taxes spill over to the next period. In this circumstance the assumption that government takes savings as given, becomes relevant. This is further discussed below.
First-best: optimal intergenerational risk sharing
The outcome when savings are endogenous is considered in graphs two and three. Graph 2 The results show that optimal transfers are contingent on the state of the economy, as they are by construction. Taxation does not necessarily increase in population growth, possibly counter intuitively. On the one hand, a high implicit rate of return induces higher contributions, on the other hand, the "insurance"
for the elderly can be accomplished by lower contributions, exactly because of the higher rate of return. This in turn leaves more scope in the …rst period for consumption or for savings.
The tax rate increases when more stock market crashes (state L) preceded.
Taxation spills over to future periods. This is exactly the principle of risk sharing Graph 5 Taxation decreases in population growth. This is the net result of two opposing e¤ects population growth has on contributions. Lower population growth decreases the rate of return of PAYG, thereby making it less attractive to redistribute from the working generation to the older generation. However, lower population growth also increases the political clout of the elderly, which has an upward e¤ect on taxation. With severe aging (n = 0:5), the maximum contributions equal 49% whereas e¢ cient taxation equals 40% in that case. This increase in taxes does not imply increased bene…ts, which equal contributions multiplied by population growth. This reproduces the central result of Breyer and Stolte [2001] , who argue that the 'burden' of aging is shared by old and young with lower bene…ts and higher contributions.
Again taxation increases in the number of previous periods that L occurred.
In state L the asset market crashes; this hurts the retirees whereas the working generation is not hit directly. As poorer voters are easier swayed, this results in redistribution from young to old in state L. Workers save less as a result.
When state L occurs a second time in a row, workers have saved less and face low returns. This makes them even worse o¤ than the generation that was …rst hit by low returns. This in turn induces an even higher transfer from the young generation that is working then. Together this leads to higher taxation every time an extra period in state L occurs. This resembles the contingent optimal taxation that likewise increases in the number of preceding market lows. While the direction of …rst-best and second-best transfers is the same, the precise height di¤ers. This is illustrated in graph 6 which gives the di¤erence between transfers for di¤erent contingencies as a function of population growth. As can be seen this is a decreasing function. In the presence of aging politics overshoots, while transfers are 'too low'in the presence of population growth.
Difference between 1st best and 2nd best transfers and its complete absence. In the latter case, which can be thought of as "autarky", the consumption during retirement age is solely determined by accrued savings.
Each young generation decides its own savings which in the baseline case equals 59%. The certainty equivalent is de…ned as the wage that makes someone in such an autarkic state (with = 0) equally well o¤ as someone that has the insurance that the …rst-best or second-best arrangements provide. 
Population growth
First-best Second-best
Graph 7
The graph shows that utility increases in population growth, which follows directly from the observation that population growth is the rate of return of a PAYG-scheme. As can also be seen, the …rst-best allocation is superior except for the case that population size is stable. In other demographic scenarios welfare dif- 
The source of ine¢ ciency
As discussed, the …rst-best and second-best transfers only coincide in a special but meaningful case. The equivalence follows analytically when savings are …xed and was illustrated above when savings are endogenous. In the latter case the equivalence can also be shown mathematically 4 . In other cases, the di¤erent ef-3 With previous savings s given and implementing a transfer scheme in state L, the SWF equals: u(sr
Here is the discount rate the social planner uses for future generations. This function is maximized w.r.t. savings (s L ; s LL ; ::) and taxes ( L ; LL ; ::). Note that only a sequence of states L is considered. Taxes in state H equal zero, so they need not be considered explicitly.
After at least one state H a new sequence arises that may lead to di¤erent taxation but that is not considered here. With = the function exactly equals a sequence of incumbent parties maximizing political support. The di¤erence is that that function is maximized each period w.r.t. current savings and taxes. However if the optimizing values of the social planner would be proposed, no individual or political party could improve upon that solution. Hence it is also the outcome of the political process. 4 Suppose histories with k periods are considered. Ex ante e¢ cient transfers are then contingent on k 1 periods. Denote by h one particular contingency of k 1 periods. Using that n = 0 …rst-best allocations follow from:
Here p(h) denotes the probability of h occurring, and s h and h denote savings and transfers in that contingency. Contingencies with the …rst k 1 periods equal to h and ending in either state H or L contribute to utility in the …rst period, whereas contingencies with the last k 1 fect of population growth is the source of the discrepancy between …rst-best and second-best. The reason is that they have a tendency to 'buy'votes by using the transfer mechanism to redistribute to larger and more pragmatic cohorts. In so, politicians overweigh large cohorts.
In the political process current political parties take future taxes as given and do not take into account that current taxes (may) in ‡uence future taxation.
The connection results from the e¤ect of taxation on private savings. If these are crowded out by public transfers, workers will have lower savings during their retirement. This in turn induces the next government to redistribute to these retirees. Higher taxes lead to higher future bene…ts for current workers. D'Amato and Galasso propose that governments take that into account. Politicians exploit their …rst-mover advantage by increasing taxes at the expense of private savings, resulting in higher taxes in the future. Taking this e¤ect into account adds another source of ine¢ ciency. Which approach is more reasonable, is an empirical question.
Nash behavior is restrictive as political parties do not consider future reactions whatsoever. The Stackelberg-approach is also not unproblematic, as the opposite extreme is assumed: governments know and take fully into account the behavior of future governments. As one period in a two-period OLG model represents 30 years, this is likewise a stark assumption. In reality there will typically be a mixed case. The assumption of Nash behavior allows focusing exlusively on the political e¤ect of cohort size on intergenerational risk sharing.
Conclusion
Intergenerational risk sharing cannot be implemented by markets. Only the govperiods equal to h and starting in either state H or L contribute to utility in the second period.
Together this gives the four parts of the expression. Simplifying that expression gives
This coincides with the second-best transfers, if …rst-best and second-best savings are equal.
This is in turn assured because for given taxes, the …rst-best savings decision and the second-best savings decision coincide. As this holds for all contingencies, …rst-best and second-best transfers coincide if n = 0.
ernment or a pension fund with mandatory participation can do so. However, political institutions have an incentive to redistribute. In the realm of intergenerational risk sharing there is thus no insurance without redistribution.
As a result ex ante e¢ ciency is generally out of reach of politics as well. Such are the unavoidable costs of political institutions. This is the …rst result of the paper: politics generally does not lead to ex ante e¢ ciency. From an ex ante perspective, politics is still better than no transfers at all and this is the second result of the paper. The third result concerns the e¤ect of aging on intergenerational risk sharing. As Bovenberg [2008] states, "the danger facing aging societies is that older voters block the needed reforms. In that case, a con ‡ict arises between the political power of older generations (who depend on public transfers and are risk averse) and the economic power of the younger, working generations (who control the major resource that fuel the modern knowledge-intensive economy -namely, human capital and entrepreneurship). In other words, politics collides with economics." In this paper a majority of retirees cannot outright block a reform, as a median voter model would have it. However, some concern is indeed warranted, as aging increases the discrepancy between …rst-and second-best outcomes.
Social Security in many countries developed in the 1930s-1950s; for example the USA implemented PAYG-…nanced Social Security in 1937 when many retirees had su¤ered the Depression. The resulting decrease in retirements was an important motive for Social Security. Although the paper does not predict a speci…c moment Social Security is implemented, timing and motivation coincide with an implication of the model that intergenerational transfers are used when retirees have witnessed a severe …nancial set-back.
The conclusions hold for a wide range of population growth rates and are robust to changes in risk aversion (not shown here) and endogeneity of savings.
The current set-up is nonetheless limited in several ways. It does not address incentive and crowding out e¤ects, thereby overestimating the gains of risk sharing.
However, by modeling only two generations the potential gain from risk sharing between more generations is underestimated. The model also does not take economic growth into account, further underestimating the return on PAYG. And by ignoring other risk-factors as longevity and productivity the importance of risk sharing is underestimated. Though a welfare gain of 31% in the base-line case is remarkably in line with …ndings of Van Hemert (33%) and Gollier (25%), it cannot be assessed a priori what the net result of these di¤erent e¤ects is. These limitations are recognized and some of them could be further incorporated into the model.
These limitations are however not essential for the main argument. If politics hinders risk-sharing in the relatively simple set-up here, then sharing risks in a more complex environment can certainly not be taken for granted. The aim of this paper is not to determine the optimal tax per se, but to provide an analytical framework to assess whether whatever is optimal arises endogenously in the political process. The bad news is that the democratic process generally does not lead to e¢ ciency. The good news is that politics does a lot better than a situation without any intergenerational transfers.
The objective is to maximize at each time t the following function. Simpli…cation of the problem by posing n = 0 does not alter the problem essentially: here, then in the one-dimensional case stability conditions are that the derivative is strictly less than 1 in absolute value. As can be seen from the graphs, shown in the appendix, this is the case.
An important assumption in the above is the zero taxation in state H. This considerably reduces the complexity of the problem. This is done for practical considerations and considering it does not change the intuition of the result. An interpretation of such a restriction is that it is not politically feasible to impose positive taxation during a booming capital market.
